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Howe: A Statutory Approach to Governmental Liability in Florida
LEGISLATION

A STATUTORY APPROACH TO GOVERNMENTAL
LIABILITY IN FLORIDA
The state of Florida and its political subdivisions cannot be sued
without their consent. This proposition, usually termed "sovereign
immunity," can be traced to the medieval English theory that "the
King can do no wrong."'I The result of its application in Florida, as
in most other states, has been to disallow suits by persons tortiously
injured by public entities. Adequate recovery for injuries inflicted by
the state is the exception rather than the rule. Only when special
provisions have been made by legislatures, either waiving the immunity or appropriating special relief, has the doctrine of sovereign
immunity been circumvented and compensation received from the
state. Yet, there is some doubt whether the historical relationship of
the king to his people justifies sovereign immunity in its modern
form.
As early as the mid-thirteenth century the king could not be sued
eo nomine in his own courts. 2 This did not mean that relief was un-

available from the government; certain devices emerged for obtaining
relief. Suits against the king were in the form of petitions and required his consent, but those writs against an officer or agency of the
crown did not. Most scholars feel that the requirement of consent
was not because the king was above the law, rather it was felt to be
illogical that he would issue a writ against himself. 3 Actually the king
was considered thoroughly just and equitable and was not privileged
to do wrong.4 The king was required to do equity. Even though a
prerogative existed with the crown, relief was readily available. 5
1. I BLACKSrONE, COMMENTARIES 289, 241-42 (1899). Blackstone has attributed
the maxim that "the King can do no wrong" to the royal prerogative, which he
defines as "that special preeminence which the King hath over and above all other
persons, and out of the course of the common law, in right of his royal dignity....
The law ascribes to the King the attribute of sovereignty." See generally 1 POLLOCK
& MArrLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 518 (1909); Note, Remedies Against
the United States and Its Officials, 70 HARv. L. REv. 827 (1957). See also Muskopf
v. Coming Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89 n.1 (1961)
and authorities cited therein. The detailed operation of the doctrine of sovereign
immunity in Florida may be found in Davis, Claims Against Public Entities, in
FLORIDA CsviL PRACTICE BEFORE TRIAL 215 (1963).
2. See Jaffee, Suits Against Government and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77
HARv. L. Rv. 1, 2-3 (1963).

3. Id. at 3-9.
4. See Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34

YAL

L.J. 1, n.2 (1924);

Jaffee, supra note 2, at 3-4.
5. 9 HoLswoRTH, A HIsrORY OF ENGLISH LAw 8 (3d ed. 1944). "[T]he king,
as the fountain of justice and equity, could not refuse to redress wrongs when
petitioned to do so by his subjects." Thus it hhs been argued that the maxim
"the King can do no wrong" originally meant precisely the contrary.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1966

1

Law Review,
Vol. 18, Iss. 4 [1966],
Art. 8
UNIVERSITY Florida
OF FLORIDA
LAW REVIEW
[Vol. XVIII
Nevertheless, in time this required consent became overgeneralized into the broad modern concept of governmental sovereign immunity.
How this immunity of the king from the jurisdiction of the king's
own courts6 came to be applied in the United States of America, where
the royal prerogative is unknown, has been called one of the mysteries of legal evolution.7 The restrictions placed upon relief available against public officials in this country may have developed from
the desire of the king to supervise his own officials, to protect their
discretion, and to follow different policies from those approved by the
courts. 8 Nevertheless, these concepts, to a great extent, have shaped
our judicial and legislative attitudes toward disallowing suits against
the sovereign governments. 9
Unlike the feudal kings, the modern sovereigns have expanded
their activities to provide many services that had long been exclusively private undertakings. Moreover, the production and sale of
electrical power, control of pollution, immunization from disease,
construction of modern highways and bridges, control of mosquito
and flood waters, maintenance of ports, operation of hospitals, and
numerous other functions were essentially unknown responsibilities
of governments until relatively recent times. Because governments,
whether federal, state, or municipal possess this immunity from
judicial suit, such relief for injuries is available only if the activity
causing the injury was undertaken by private enterprise. Such a
situation has left a serious hiatus in the administration of justice to
the injured claimant.
Before 194610 an individual who suffered injury by the fault or
negligence of the federal government was faced squarely with this
6. Borchard, supra note 4, at 4. "Nothing seems more clear than this immunity of the King from the jurisdiction of the King's courts was purely personal."
7. Id. at 4 (suggesting that none of the criteria for its origin and existence
have ever existed in this country).
8. Jaffee, supra note 2, at 3.
9. The first case to hold that local governmental units were not liable for
tort was Russell v. Men of Devon, 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (1788) in which an action
was dismissed against an unincorporated county. The court found no fund out

of which the judgment could be paid and held, "[I]t is better that an individual
should sustain an injury than that the public should suffer an inconvenience."
Id. at 362. This rule was adopted first in Massachusetts in Mower v. Inhabitants
of Leicester, 9 Mass. 237, 239 (1812).
10. The initial attempt to adopt a comprehensive federal act came with the
establishment of the Court of Claims in 1885, which possessed jurisdiction over
all claims founded upon any law of Congress or upon any contract express or
implied. The Supreme Court, by construction, entirely excluded tort claims from
their jurisdiction. Since that time three unsuccessful attempts were made by
Congress in 1929, 1940, and 1942 to pass a general tort claims law until the passage
of the present act. An excellent review of the legislative history of the Federal

Tort Claims Act appears in a Comment, 56 YALE L.J. 535 (1947). See also Report
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historical immunity of the sovereign. Although no judicial action
would lie against the federal government, relief was available in the
form of a special bill sought through Congress. Even though theoretically a just procedure, it became apparent that such a system of
legislative relief was wholly inadequate and tended only to divert the
attentions of Congress from the conduct of national affairs."
In 1946 the Federal Tort Claims Act was passed as an attempt to
provide for the administration of tort claims against the federal
government.12 The FTCA waived the necessity for consent in all
cases involving the negligent or wrongful acts or omissions of the
Government or its officers, other than in those actions specifically
excepted. 3 In line with the gradual recognition of the expanded
role of Government and the added responsibilities thus imposed, the
FTCA waived the immunity of the United States relating to tort
claims "in the same manner and to the same extent as a private in4
dividual under like circumstances."'
New York was the only state to enact a general waiver of sovereign
immunity preceding the FTCA; its legislature waived all tort immunity at the state level in 1929.15 Since the FTCA, however, there
have been numerous state court decisions' 6 and state statutes 7 that
of the Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress To Accompany S. 2177.
SEN. REP.No. 1400, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1946).
11. The recommendation of the Joint Committee on Reorganization of Congress that the United States should consent to be sued in tort was presented under
the heading: "More Efficient Use of Congressional Time." See Gellhorn & Lauer,
Federal Liability for Personal and Property Damage, 29 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1325, 1329

(1954).
12.The Federal Tort Claims Act, ch. 753, 60 Stat. 842 (1946) (codified in scattered

sections of 28 U.S.C.) [hereinafter referred to as FTCA].
13. 28 U.S.C. §2680 (1964).
14. 28 U.S.C. §2674 (1964).
15. N.Y. CT. CL.Acr §8 (the liability thereunder has been curtailed to some
extent by legislative modifications in an effort to meet special problems, and
has been judicially construed to provide some immunity for "purely governmental"
functions. See Herzog, Liability of the State of New York for "Purely Governmental" Functions, 10 SYRAcusE L. Rav. 30 (1958).
16. E.g., New York (Bernardine v. City of New York, 249 N.Y. 361, 62 N.E.2d
604 (1945) (local entities only)); Florida (Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96
So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1957) (local entities only)); Illinois (Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist., 18 Ill.
2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 88 (1959) (local entities only)); California (Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457, 11 Cal.
Rptr. 89 (1961) (all public entities)); Michigan (Williams v. City of Detroit, 364
Mich. 231, 111 N.W.2d 1 (1961)); Minnesota (Spanel v. Mounds View School Dist.,
118 N.W.2d 795 (Minn. 1962)); Wisconsin (Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis.
2d 26, 115 N.W.2d 618 (1962)). See also Hernandez v. County of Yuma, 91 Ariz.
35, 369 P.2d 271 (1962) (Arizona may be preparing to eliminate the doctrine of
immunity).
17. Illinois (37 ILL. ANN. STAT. §§439.1-.25 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1961)) (state
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indicate a gradual recognition of the necessity of tort liability in
various areas of municipal, county, and even state governmental activity.1 This trend toward increased governmental liability since the
FTCA, however, has developed in varying degrees19 and without any
uniform approach by the several states that have faced the issue.
The reasons for the preservation or abolition of a state's sovereign
immunity vary with the peculiar circumstances existing within each
state. Although initially the antiquity of the immunity doctrine
seemed to fully account for its existence in this country, more
recently it has been preserved for more practical considerations. It
has been argued that to abolish any immunity would destroy the
efficient administration of the states, hinder the public welfare, and
endanger the public safety. Specifically, many state legislatures have
feared the prohibitive cost of undertaking any major steps toward
allowing recovery from public entities. Other state courts have
based their restraint upon the policy of maintaining the separation
of powers 20 and have been apprehensive of overturning a well-established doctrine without being able to provide any adequate general
guidelines.
The sterile attitude of some state legislatures has forced a few
courts to assume the responsibility of establishing the liability of
tortious public entities, their officers, and employees.21 Still other
state courts were motivated by the inadequacies of sporadic and piecemeal statutory waivers that were frequently confusing and contra-

only); Washington (WASH. STAT. 1961, ch. 136) (state only); Kentucky (Ky. REv.
STAT. §44.070) (state negligence only); North Carolina (N.C. GEN. STAT. §143-291)
(state negligence only); Alaska (ALASKA COMp. LAWS ANN. §56-2-2) (local entities
only, as construed in City of Fairbanks v. Schaible, 375 P.2d 201 (Alaska 1962));
ALASKA COMP. LAws ANN.

§§56-7-1 to -10 (Supp. 1957) (state only); Hawaii

(HAWAII

REv. LAWS §§245 A-I to -17 Supp. 1963)) (state only). See also Utah and Nevada,
which perhaps enacted waiver legislation in 1965 but were unavailable at time of
writing.
18. E.g., FLA. STAT. §455.06 (1965) (granting authority to counties, state
agencies, and certain political subdivisions to purchase liability insurance); FLA.
STAT. §232.43 (1965) (insuring students engaged in athletic activities); FLA. STAT.
§234.03 (1965) (liability insurance covering school bus transportation).
19. Most statutes allowing purchase of insurance limit the recovery to the
maximum amount of such insurance. Also punitive damages have not been
allowed in Florida. See Fisher v. City of Miami, 172 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 1965), 18
U. FLA. L. REv. 173.
20. This contention was discarded by the California court in Muskopf v.
Corning Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1961) when
the court stated, "The doctrine of governmental immunity was originally court
made." Id. 55 Cal. 2d at 218, 359 P.2d at 461, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 93.

21. See cases cited supra note 16.
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dictory.22 The reasoning of these latter courts was best expressed by
23
Justice Traynor in Muskopf v. Corning Hospital District:
The rule of governmental immunity for tort is an
anachronism without rational basis, and has existed only by
the force of inertia ....
None of the reasons for its continuance can withstand analysis. No one defends governmental immunity. In fact, it
does not exist. It has become riddled with exceptions, both
legislative and judicial, and the exceptions operate so illogically
as to cause serious inequality.... The illogical and inequitable
extreme is reached in this case: we are asked to affirm a rule
that denies recovery to one injured in a county or hospital
district hospital, although recovery may be had by one injured
in a city and county hospital.
Despite such efforts by the bench, the desirability of judicial
change in this area is questionable. A case-by-case approach would
not only invite frequent and expensive litigation that could largely
be avoided by a comprehensive tort claims act, but it would also
leave in the hands of the judiciary the responsibility for balancing
policy considerations and striking a practical solution to issues that
are essentially political in nature and thus particularly within the
competence and experience of legislators. 24 The major obstacles to
a legislative approach arise in delineating the policy and scope of
liability and in providing for the increased liability that will inevitably
ensue upon financially unprepared political subdivisions of the state.
Following the Muskopf decision, the California Legislature instituted
a two-year moratorium of the liability imposed by the abolition of
governmental immunity in that case.25 This was done to provide
enough time for formulation of an acceptable approach that would
22.

CAL.

IMMUNITY:

4

REPORTS,

LAW

REVISION

COMM'N,

RECOMMENDATION

RELATING

TO

SOVEREIGN

NUMBER 1-TORT LIABILITY OF PUBLIC ENTITIES AND PUBLIC EMPLOYEES,
RECOMMENDATIONS

& STUDMS 807

n.5 (1963) [hereinafter cited as 4

REPORTS, RECOMMENDATIONS & STUDIES].

23. 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1961).
24. Id. at 216, 359 P.2d at 460, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 94.
25. CAL. Crv. CODE §1404 (1961). This legislation suspended the effect of the
decisions in Muskopf and Lipman v. Brisbane Elementary School Dist., 55 Cal. 2d
224, 359 P.2d 465, 11 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1961) in which it was stated that the doctrine

of discretionary immunity, which protects public employees from liability for
their discretionary acts, might not protect public entities from liability in all

situations in which the employees are immune. Such suspension would continue
until the ninety-first day after the adjournment of the 1963 Regular Session of
the Legislature. At that time, unless legislative action should be taken, the state

and other public entities in California would have been liable for their torts under
conditions set forth in those cases.
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allow full recovery without placing an oppressive administrative and
financial burden on its public entities. As a result of their efforts,
26
the California Legislature enacted a comprehensive tort claims act,
which will be reviewed in detail later.
THE PRESENT SITUATION IN FLORIDA

In 1957, the Florida Supreme Court in Hargrove v. Town of
Cocoa Beach 27 promulgated a fresh attitude toward municipal liability
in this country. The court allowed recovery against the city for an

injury negligently inflicted by a city employee who was acting within
the scope of his employment. 2

It

ignored any distinction between

governmental and proprietary functions. More recently the Florida
court has allowed recovery from a municipality as the result of an
intentional tort.2 9 Although certain limitations remain,3° the effect
of these decisions is to abolish the doctrine of sovereign tort immunity

in suits against Florida's municipal corporations.
Above the municipal level, however, the doctrine remains firmly
entrenched.

The

courts have consistently held that counties

and

other public entities, unlike municipal corporations, are organized

as political subdivisions 3 of the state and constitute agencies of the
32
state government and share the state's immunity from suit in tort.
Historically, the application of this doctrine has promoted an inadequate and unjust relationship between the modern public entity and
its citizens.
In 1939, the First District Court of Appeal in Buck v. McLean3 3

refused to allow recovery when a paying spectator at a high school
baseball game was injured by a foul ball.

26.

The county board of

CAL. Gov'T CODE §§810-970.6.

27. 96 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1957).
28. In Hargrove a prisoner died of smoke suffocation after being locked in
a jail that was left unattended by the city jailer.
29. City of Miami v. Simpson, 172 So. 2d 435 (Fla. 1965), 18 U. FLA. L. REv.
173.
30. The Supreme Court of Florida has specifically preserved municipal immunity for the exercise of legislative, judicial, quasi-legislative, and quasi-judicial
functions. These exceptions were illustrated in such cases as Akin v. City of Miami,
65 So. 2d 54 (Fla. 1953); Elrod v. City of Daytona Beach, 132 Fla. 24, 180 So. 378
(1938).
31. But see FLA. STAT. §1.01 (10) (1965). The words "public body," "body
politic," or "political sub-division" include counties, cities, towns, villages, special
tax school districts, special road and bridge districts, bridge districts, and all other
districts in this state.
32. See Butts v. County of Dade, 178 So. 2d 592, 594 (Fla. 1965); Kaulakis v.
Boyd, 138 So. 2d 505, 507 (Fla. 1962).
33. 115 So. 2d 764 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1959).
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public instruction owned the park and had negligently allowed the
protective screen to deteriorate. The district court held that the
state's immunity from suit is absolute and that county boards of public
instruction are agencies of the state, clothed with the same degree of
immunity as the state. The court recognized: "It is a harsh doctrine
indeed which leaves one without remedy for wrong suffered by him
through the negligence of a state agent or employee committed while
performing a proprietary function, but under similar circumstances
imposes liability on everyone else engaged in the performance of
similar functions."3 4 In spite of its empathy for the plaintiff's situation, the court maintained that any change must come either by
constitutional amendment or appropriate legislation or both.3 5 In
Rabin v. Lake Worth DrainageDistrict,36 when a landowner's crop
was damaged as a result of a chemical herbicide used by the drainage
district, the landowner was precluded from recovery because while
acting in its governmental capacity as a public corporation the district
was immune from responsibility.
The denial of relief in such cases is consistent because suits against
the state are barred by the Florida Constitution unless specifically
authorized by statute. Section 22 of article III of the Florida Constitution states that provisions for suing the state for existing or future
liabilities must be made by general law. "[]he purpose of this
section has been interpreted to leave the Legislature untrammeled as
to 'all liabilities now existing or hereinafter originating' but to limit
the method of the exercise of this power to the passage of general
rather than special or local laws."3 7 Thus, the legislature could
authorize suits to be brought against the state or individual state
agency while limiting the class of actions that may be brought so
long as such classification is reasonable and qualifies as a general law.
The Florida Supreme Court in distinguishing a general from a special
or local law has stated: "A statute which relates to persons or things
as a class is a general law, while a statute which relates to particular
34. Buck v. McLean, 115 So. 2d 764, 768 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1959).
35. Ibid. The court recognized that other state courts had abrogated the
sovereignty of their county school districts, but felt compelled to follow the established law of their own jurisdictions. Earlier in Richter v. Board of Pub. Instruction
of Dade County, 91 So. 2d 795 (Fla. 1957), the Supreme Court of Florida had denied
recovery against the defendant school board for the alleged tortious death of a
pupil enrolled in a Dade County public school. The court also recognized FLA.
CONsT. art. XII, §§9, 13 that make it questionable whether the school board could
be liable without amending the constitution. These sections require that school
funds be disbursed solely for the support and maintenance of public free schools,
and no laws may authorize the diversion of school funds to any other than school
purposes.
36. 82 So. 2d 353 (Fla. 1955).
37. Davis v. Love, 99 Fla. 333, 352, 126 So. 374, 381 (1930).
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persons or things of a class is special and comes within the constitutional prohibition." 38, Consequently, under section 22 of article III,
when the legislature authorized suits against the state road department
and limited such suits to contract claims for work done, it was considered an enactment of a general law. 39
Despite the constitutional provisions authorizing the legislature
to permit suits against the state by general law, the Florida Legislature has enacted only a few limited waivers for tort actions in the
areas of public vehicles and other selected activities. And, in these
situations it has provided that such liability extends only to the
maximum limit of liability insurance purchased by the state agency. 40
As a result, the state of Florida can neither be sued 4' nor can it
be made a party defendant42 without its consent given by general
law. 43 Furthermore, suits against state officers, in which the state is
the real party against which relief is sought, are considered suits
against the state.

44

The Claims Bill System
Although judicial relief against the tortious state agency is barred
in most situations by the sovereign immunity of the state, some relief
is nevertheless available. The immunity doctrine in Florida has coexisted with our present system of legislative relief known as the
"claims bill system."
The Florida Constitution provides for this system of recovery
through the passage of either a special or general bill to satisfy
claims for damages caused by the state or its political subdivisions.45
The rules for the 1965 regular session of the Florida Senate provided that all bills for payment of claims in excess of 1,000 dollars
from the general revenue fund of the state should be referred to the
Appropriations Committee and the Claims Committee. It was then
the committees' duty to assess the validity and extent of the claimant's
injuries and to make recommendations.
The Florida Constitution requires that all claim bills must be
passed by two-thirds of the members elected to each house of the
38.
39.
40.
41.

Ex parte Wells, 21 Fla. 280, 310 (1885).
Davis v. Love, 99 Fla. 333, 351, 126 So. 374, 380 (1930).
See note 18 supra.
Cone v. Wakulla County, 143 Fla. 880, 197 So. 536 (1940); Southern Drain-

age Dist. v. State, 93 Fla. 672, 112 So. 561 (1927).
42. Tax Securities Corp. v. Securities Inv. Corp., 115 Fla. 536, 155 So. 752 (1934).
43. Southern Drainage Dist. v. State, 93 Fla. 672, 112 So. 561 (1927).
44. Hampton v. State Bd. of Educ., 90 Fla. 88, 105 So. 323 (1925).
45. The authoritative basis for claims bills is found in FLA. CONST. art. XVI,
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legislature before any money shall be appropriated or paid on a
claim. The special or local bills are payable out of county funds;
general bills are payable out of state funds.
Although the various committees honestly endeavor to secure a
fair and reasonable retribution for the injured claimant, they must
necessarily fall short of providing a plenary judicial determination.
Many of the disadvantages of such a system are the result of legislative assumption of a purely judicial function.
A similar system existed at the federal level before the FTCA. In
fact, claims bills remain at the federal level for those actions and
claims that have not been delegated to the jurisdiction of any court. 46
The time-consuming and diversionary nature of the system was a
major reason for the passage of the FTCA.47 This same problem now
burdens the Florida Legislature.
There are even more serious burdens upon the claimants. The
mechanics of the system places a premium on political influence and
favoritism. A justifiable claim for relief should be free from politics,
but occasionally the success of a claim may depend more upon the
status of the claimant than upon the merit of his claim. The system
often imposes a costly burden of delay until the legislature assembles
and is able to consider the claims presented. Most significant, however, is the violation of the traditional concept of a judicial remedy
for every wrong. A claimant is denied the right to a public review
by his peers and must submit to the untrammeled discretion of the
state to restrict its own liability. The system is in the nature of a
civil bill of attainder and has been sharply criticized by eminent
48
writers.
TH-E

NEED FOR LEGISLATION IN FLORIDA

The basic need for legislation in the area of governmental immunity in Florida is predicated upon an inadequate claims bill system and the absence of sufficient general statutory provisions waiving
the immunity of the state and providing uniform and full relief. The
courts of Florida have been unwilling to provide the solution for the
state and its political subdivisions, and this is as it should be. Even
so, the Florida Supreme Court has set the tone for the legislature with
46. For example, 28 U.S.C. §2680 lists specific exceptions to actions that may
be brought under the FTCA. Thus, to seek recovery for injuries resulting from
an intentional tort the claimant must seek a special claims bill from the Congress.
All contract claims will be brought in the court of claims and all tort claims,
except those specifically excepted, will be brought in the federal district courts.
47. See note 11 supra.
48. See Pound, The Tort Claims Act: Reason or History, 30 NACCA L.J. 404,

409 (1964).
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its recent decisions in the area of municipal liability. As a result of
these recent decisions and the consistent refusal of the courts to
abrogate the immunity above the municipal level, there exists a
dichotomy between complete judicial relief at the local level and
purely legislative relief at the county and state levels. It is conceivable,
from the experiences of other states, that this immunity above the
municipal level will not withstand all future attacks. It is suggested
that an intensive effort be undertaken to secure a just system of public
liability that is tailored to the needs of the rural as well as the urban
centers, the special districts as well as the counties, and the officers
as well as the employees of the state.
LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION

Comprehensive legislation solutions have taken a variety of forms
ranging from the blanket waiver of all immunity to the comprehensive enumeration of selected waivers. The degrees of specificity most
clearly delineate the three basic approaches.
The broadest waiver is that adopted by New York, which
provides:

4

1

The State hereby waives its immunity from liability and action
and hereby assumes liability and consents to have the same
determined in accordance with the same rules of law as applied to actions in the Supreme Court against individuals or
corporations, provided the claimant complies with the limitations of this article ....
It has been argued that the blanket waiver is tantamount to no
legislative action at all for it essentially continues to leave the entire
policymaking to the courts.50 Numerous problems are created when
the courts are compelled to treat all public entities as if they were
individuals and delicate and complex questions will surely arise
concerning prior statutory waivers that remain on the books unless
49. N.Y. CT. CL. Acr §8.
50. Van Alstyne, Governmental Tort Liability: A Public Policy Prospectus, 10
U.C.L.A.L. REv. 463, 467-70 (1963). In construing this section, the New York
courts agreed that the legislature had the right to authorize the courts to hear
claims against the state. See Rieseberg v. State, 40 Misc. 2d 676, 243 N.Y.S.2d 887
(1963). They have also held that since civil divisions of the state have no independent sovereignty, when the state waived its immunity, the immunity of municipal components disappeared to precisely the same extent. Speigler v. School
Dist. of City of New Rochelle, 39 Misc. 2d 720, 241 N.Y.S.2d 967, afJ'd, 19 App.

Div. 2d 751, 243 N.Y.S.2d 74 (2d Dep't 1963). See also Town of Amherst v. Niagara
Frontier Port Authority, 38 Misc. 2d 906, 238 N.Y.S.2d 710 (1963), rev'd on other
grounds, 19 App. Div. 2d 107, 241 N.Y.S.2d 247 (4th Dep't 1963) (the state and
its agencies are not subject to suits in equity in the absence of statutory authority).
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they are found to have been impliedly superseded. Otherwise it will
be the duty of the courts to reinterpret such statutes in light of the
new legislative intent.
A second basic approach is that of the FTCA. In 1946, Congress
accepted the broad waiver approach introduced by New York when
it provided that the United States is liable for tort claims "in the
same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under
like circumstances .. ."51. But the FTCA went further than the New
York act by enumerating specific exceptions 52 to the general waiver.
This same approach has been followed by the states of Alaska 53 and
Hawaii.5 4
The third method of statutory waiver involves a detailed and
comprehensively tailored program of public liability. The statutes
narrowly define the policy considerations, scope, and extent of
liability as well as provide for the administration of claims. This
method represents an effort to satisfy the needs of order and predictability at all levels of public activity by conforming such liability
to the unique considerations of each activity. This type of act does
not initially waive the existing immunity as did New York and the
FTCA, but rather the existing immunity is retained except where
it is specifically waived by statute.
In accepting this latter approach, the California Law Revision
Commission rejected the New York and FTCA methods, stating:55
A statute imposing liability with specified exceptions would
provide the governing bodies of public entities with little basis
upon which to budget for the payment of claims and judgments for damages, for public entities would be faced with a
vast area of unforeseen situations, any one of which could

51. 28 U.S.C. §2674 (1964). It is important to note that the FTCA does not
contain any substantive tort law, but rather provides that in all cases he substantive rights of the claimants are to be determined in accordance with the law
of the state in which the tort occurred. United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150 (1963);
Hess v. United States, 361 U.S. 314 (1960).

52. 28 U.S.C. §2680 (1964).
53. ALASKA CoMp. LAws ANN. §§56-7-1 to -10 (Supp. 1957).
54. HAwAu Rxv. LAws §§245 A-1 to -17 (Supp. 1963).
55. 4 REPORTS, REcOMMENDATIONS & STUDIES 811. Although the criticisms
leveled by the California Commission are perhaps reasonable inferences from the
sweeping language of the New York Act, the New York courts have tempered the
scope of the broad waiver by construing exceptions. See also Weiss v. Fote, 7
N.Y.2d 579, 585, 167 N.E.2d 63, 65, 200 N.Y.S.2d 409, 412 (1960), 26 ALBANY L.
REv. 75 (1961) in which the court refused to hold the city of Buffalo liable for
its negligence in designing the clearance interval for traffic lights. See also N.Y.
JOINT LEGISLATiVE CommrrrEE ON MUNICIPAL TORT LIABILITY, FIFTH REPORT (Legis.
Doc. No. 36, 1959).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1966

11

Florida
Law Review,
Vol. 18, Iss. 4 [1966],
Art. 8
LAW REVIEW
UNIVERSITY OF
FLORIDA
[Vol. XVIII
give rise to costly litigation and a possible damage judgment.
Such a statute would invite actions brought in hopes of imposing liability on theories not yet tested in the courts and
could result in greatly expanding the amount of litigation
and the attendant expense which public entities would face.
Moreover, the cost of insurance under such a statute would no
doubt be greater than under a statute which provided for
immunity except to the extent provided by enactment, since
an insurance company would demand a premium designed to
protect against the indefinite area of liability that exists under
a statute imposing liability with specified exceptions.
TORT LIABILITY OF PUBLIC ENTITIES AND PUBLIC EMPLOYEES

Employee Immunity
Historically, in this country, governmental officers and employees
have been liable for their actions unless authorized within the scope
of their employment. Judges and high executive officers, s 6 however,
have been considered immune from suit because of a fear that to
make them liable for their actions would impair their ability to carry
out their duties efficiently.57 Indeed, judges were immune even for
malicious acts. 5s Lower executive officers were not liable for their
discretionary functions, but could be liable for purely ministerial
duties.5 9 It was felt that activities requiring a certain amount of
personal discretion warranted, within limits, some latitude of immunity to encourage efficient operations.60 But when the action of an
employee is simply that of executing a function and all of the discretion has been exercised at a higher level, he is required to carry
out the order within reasonable limits and is liable for any tort he
61
might commit.

56. California is the only state that has a substantial body of case law
adopting the federal courts' approach of extended immunity to administrative
officers. See Dray, Private Wrongs of Public Servants, 47 CALIF. L. REV. 303, 346
(1959).
57. See generally Note, Remedies Against the United States and Its Officials,
70 HARV. L. REv. 827 (1957).
58. Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 347 (1872).
59. Cf. Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 (1896). See also CAL. GOV'T CODE §820.4.
60. Federal Bureau of Investigation agent has discretion in arresting, but his
immunity extends no further than the existence of probable cause. On the other
hand, a federal prosecuting attorney has unlimited immunity in initiating actions.
See Kozlowski v. Ferrara, 117 F. Supp. 650, 652 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
61. Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U.S. 605 (1912); American School of
Magnetic Healing v. McAnnutly, 187 U.S. 94 (1902).
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It has been suggested that the immunity enjoyed by the officers
and employees of the governing sovereign is but an extension of the
immunity of that sovereign and that when the immunity of the
sovereign is waived, the immunity of the employee is nonexistent
because he is essentially acting for the sovereign. But such is not
the case. The immunity of officers and employees for their discretionary acts rests on grounds entirely independent of those justifying
the state's immunity from liability for torts that its agents have
committed.
The immunity afforded the employee is designed to shield him
from undue harassment from spiteful, vengeful, or litigation-prone
individuals. 62 Judge Learned Hand provided excellent insight into
the rationale of this unique doctrine when he rejected the argument
that such immunity was designed to protect the guilty public em63
ployee:
The justification for . . . [employee immunity] is that it is
impossible to know whether the claim is well founded until the
case has been tried, and that to submit all officials, the innocent
as well as the guilty, to the burden of a trial and to the inevitable danger of its outcome, would dampen the ardor of all
but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible, in the unflinching discharge of their duties .*... In this instance it has
been thought in the end better to leave unredressed the wrongs
done by dishonest officers than to subject those who try to do
their duty to the constant dread of retaliation.
Once it is understood that the immunity granted an employee of
the sovereign is unrelated to that enjoyed by the sovereign itself, then
in most situations it would be illogical to deny all relief simply because the employee caused the injuries while performing a discretionary function. Because we shield an employee from harassment
and retardation in the performance of his duties must we likewise
deny the injured claimant relief from the employer-sovereign? The
answer would seem to be "yes" in California. 64 The California Legislature declared that a public entity is liable for a negligent or wrongful act or omission by its employee within the scope of his employ62. Van Alystyne, supra note 50, at 486.
63. Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S.
949 (1950).
64. Besides the fear that personal liability might inhibit the public employee
from carrying out his duties with diligence, comparable immunity was justified
in California on the ground that rising expenses and a limited tax base may make
a public employee as apprehensive of the effect of governmental liability upon
the budget he must administer as would personal liability. See 4 REPORT, RECOMMENDATIONS & STUDIEs 810.
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ment to the extent that the employee is personally liable for such
act or omission.65 This conformity of the liability of the public entity
and its employees has been expanded to grant immunity to the employee when the public entity is immune, and likewise, to grant
immunity to the public entity when the employee would not be liable
for his own tortious acts or omissions.16 Thus because the California
courts have held that a public employee is immune from liability
for his discretionary acts within the scope of his employment, even if
there be abuse,67 the employer would remain immune.
This reasoning has been criticized inasmuch as the act is designed
to secure relief for tortiously injured parties. Simply because the
rule maintains the immunity of the employee while performing a
discretionary function, it is difficult to understand why the state
should not now compensate for these injuries.68

Discretionaryand MinisterialFunctions
The distinction between discretionary and purely ministerial functions has been written into the FTCA. The United States is not
liable for claims based upon an act or omission of a government
employee when the function or duty required of the federal agency
or employee is discretionary. It does not matter that the discretion
involved was abused.69 Whether the conduct of a government employee is a discretionary function is a matter to be decided under
the act rather than under state rules relative to political, judicial,
quasi-judicial, and ministerial functions.70 Generally, the distinction
is between those acts done at a planning level and those at the
operational level. But the United States Supreme Court has held
that this immunity remains for a discretionary plan developed under
a direct delegation of plan-making authority from the top.7 1 The
65. CAL. Gov'T CODE §815.2 (a). This is the rule that had been applicable to
all public entities in the state insofar as their proprietary functions are concerned.
66. CAL. GOV'T CODE §815.2 (b).
67. This rule has been codified in CAL. Gov'T CODE §820.2.
68. 4 REPORTS, RECOMMENDATIONS &: STUDIEs 815-16. The act already contains
certain exceptions discussed infra. The California Commission recognized that the
rule would be especially harsh when the injuries are the result of deliberate and
malicious abuses of governmental authority and is continuing its study to determine
if modifications should be made.
69. 28 U.S.C. §2680 (a) (1964).
70. United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150 (1963).
71. Early cases construing the "discretionary function" provisions by the
United States Supreme Court attempting to set a firm interpretation were unsatisfactory and caused unreasonable hardship. In Dalehite v. United States, 346
U.S. 15 (1953), the Court was faced with the Texas City disaster in which a tanker
explosion caused extensive damage and injury, but recovery was not allowed be-
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weakness of such reasoning is that it enables the courts to apply immunity at even the lowest levels of governmental activity and, consequently, to defeat the original intention of the act to make the
government liable.72 The provision was obviously not intended to
deny recovery at all levels of activity, but was thought necessary to
give courts the flexibility to insure the efficient exercise of discretionary duties by government employees without the pressure of a threat
of suit. 73
Countless suggestions have been made to aid the courts in establishing a settled rule7 4 yet there remains no definite limit to what
is discretionary under the FTCA. Perhaps there is no answer short of
a major statutory revision, as one writer has suggested, except to
rely upon the sound wisdom of the court within broad policy limits
determined on a case-by-case basis. But it is clear that modifications
to this broad policy rule will provide a better system of just compensation and a sounder public policy.
The fault does not lie with the application of this viscous rule of
descretionary activities, but lies with the assumption upon which it
is predicated. The assumption is that immunity or liability should
be resolved upon whether the government officer or employee was
required to use discretion in carrying out his duties or whether he
was merely following stated orders of discretion exercised at a higher
level. It would be a more reliable and an easier rule to apply if the
immunity preserved depended solely upon whether the employee was
acting in accordance with a statute or regulation, regardless of its
validity, and to enumerate specific liability situations rather than pass
on each situation as it arises.
The California Commission, in an effort to clarify the dilemma of
cause the Court concluded that discretionary functions under the FTCA includes
more than the initiation of programs and activities. It also "includes determinations made by executives or administrators in establishing plans, specifications or
schedules of operations. Where there is room for policy judgment and decision
there is discretion. It necessarily follows that acts of subordinates in carrying out
the operations of government in accordance with official directions cannot be
actionable." Id. at 35-36 (1953).
72. Indian River Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955). "The
broad and just purposes which the statute was designed to effect was to compensate the victims of negligence in the conduct of governmental activities .... "
Once the Government had exercised its discretion, it was obligated to use due
care. Id. at 68-9.
73. See generally Handler & Klein, The Defense of Privilege in Defamation
Suits Against Government Executive Officials, 74 HAuv. L. Ray. 44, 78 (1960);
Note, Torts: National and International Sovereign Immunity, 16 OKLA. L. R v.
457, 461 (1963).
74. Several of these suggestions are collected in Note, Torts: National and
International Sovereign Immunity, 16 OKLA. L. Rv.457, 463 (1963).
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discretionary immunity, recommended specific statutory provisions
that would indicate whether or not liability exists in particular situations. The resulting statutes were concentrated in those areas in
which tort claims most often arise.75 But in the absence of a specific
statutory waiver, any immunity must depend upon the ministerialdiscretionary dichotomy.
The commission concluded that under certain circumstances a
public entity should be liable even though no public employee would
be liable. Thus in some cases in which public property is in a
dangerous condition or a public entity fails to exercise reasonable
diligence to comply with applicable statutory minimum safety standards for public equipment or public improvements, only the public
entity will be liable. Also the public entities are responsible for
the tortious acts and omissions of independent contractors to the
same extent as private persons.7 6 It was felt that they should not be
able to escape their responsibilities by contracting away their hazardous duties.
Perhaps the most extensive specific statutory liability of the public
entities of California is the liability of the public for the breach of
its obligations as an occupier of land.7 7 The code has discarded the
traditional concept of invitee, licensee, or trespasser and has based
all liability upon the failure of the public occupier or owner to take
all reasonable precautions once it knows or has reason to know that
to persons who will
the condition creates a substantial risk of harm
78
foreseeably use the property with due care.
The California code, however, also recognizes specific immunities
that continue to exist. Whereas the New York Act often left its
immunities to be determined by the courts,79 the California statutes
codified many of the exceptions that had evolved under the New
York Act and the FTCA.
The California Commission felt the essential governmental character of certain activities made them inappropriate for judicial review. In many instances the review of public officials' decisionmaking is reserved to the electorate who have the ultimate respon-

75. These major areas include: (1) the dangerous condition of property owned
or occupied by a public entity, (2) police and correctional activities, (3) fire protection, and (4) medical and hospital and public health activities.
76. CAL. Gov'T CODE §815.4.
77. CAL. Gov'T CODE §§830-835.4.
78. CAL. GOV'T CODE §830.2. Under this statute the courts are required to
determine that there is evidence from which a reasonable person could conclude
that a substantial, as opposed to a possible, risk is involved before they may
permit the jury to find that a condition is dangerous.
79. See note 55 supra.
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sibility5 0 Consequently, public entities and their employees are not
liable for:
(1) any injuries resulting from the adoption or failure to
adopt any statute, ordinance, or regulation,sl
(2) the execution of any law with due care though later it may
82
be held unconstitutional,
83
(3) the failure to enforce the law,
(4) the granting, refusifg, revoking, or suspending any license
or similar authorization,8 4 or
(5) the failure of preventing another from negligently or
wrongfully injuring another.85
It is also recognized that public employers are not liable for malicious
subordinates
prosecution, nor are they liable for the acts of their
87
misconduct.
some
of
guilty
were
themselves
unless they
Intentional Torts
The commission did not accept the FTCA's exclusion of liability
for intentional torts. 88 Congress thought that intentional torts would
be too difficult to defend and that they might open the doors to exaggerated and unreasonable recoveries.8 9 Neither of these fears appears
80. The basis of this conclusion seems to be in the desired maintenance of a
separation of powers. See 4 REPORTS, RECOMMENDATIONS & STUDmES 817.
81. CAL. Gov'T CODE §§818.2 (public entity), 821 (public employees).
82. CAL. Gov'T CODE §§820.4 (public entities), 820.6 (public employees).
83. CAL. Gov'T CODE §821.
84. CAL. Gov'T CODE §§818.4 (public entities), 821.2 (public employees).
85. Thus if a public building inspector negligently inspects or fails to inspect
any property, other than public property, there will be no liability. So, too, is immunity extended to allow adequate inspection for health and safety requirements
on private property without fear of liability. See CAL. Gov'T CODE §§816.6 (public
entities), 821.4 (public employees); see also CAL. Gov'T CODE §§855.4, .6. It was
also felt that the public should not be liable for programs benefiting the public
that may fall short of perfection. Thus the public is not liable for failure to provide adequate police (CAL. Gov'T CODE §§845, .2) or fire protection (CAL. Gov'T
CODE §§850, .2, .4.
86. CAL. Gov'T CODE §821.6 continues the immunity of the public employee
for malicious prosecution and §816 makes the public entity liable, but under
§825.6 the public entity may recover any amounts paid on the judgment from the
employer whose maliciousness caused the injury.
87. But see Foyster v. Tutuska, 44 Misc. 2d 303, 253 N.Y.S.2d 634 (1964) in
which a sheriff was held responsible for the negligence of his deputies in the
performance of their duties in criminal matters.
88. 28 U.S.C. §2680 (h) (1964). On June 17, 1965, Senator Yarborough introduced a bill to provide for compensation to persons injured by certain criminal
acts. S. 2155, 89th Cong., Ist Sess. (1965).
89.

See Hearings on S. 269 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 76th

Cong., 3d Sess. 39 (1940). See also Comment, 56 YALE L.J. 534, 547 (1947).
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well founded enough to deny all recovery. The difficulty of defending
any suit should not be cause to preserve immunity when an individual has been intentionally harmed by the employees or agencies of
the Government any more than for negligent injuries. The private
corporation must assume the consequences of intentional wrongdoing
by its employees acting within the scope of their employment. The
preservation of this distinction for the protection of the federal
government seems unjustified and contrary to the purpose and policy
of the act of providing a remedy for injured persons. The fear of
excessive claims is tempered by providing that all cases shall be heard
without a jury and that no punitive damages may be awarded.90
This arbitrary exclusion of redress for intentional torts has led some
courts to withhold federal liability by applying the technical substantive definitions of state tort law. 91 One writer has suggested a
limitation of these intentional tort exceptions to only those torts
committed with an evil attitude. 9 2 Perhaps there is some merit in
this approach, but realistically the malice and corruption present in
any tort, as well as the seriousness of the tort, is essentially a consideration involved in determining whether it occurred within the scope
of employment. As such, any express exception might be directed at
specific torts rather than at the subjective state of mind of the tortfeasor.

93

Punitive Damages
Under the FTCA94 and California Act 95 no recovery is allowed
for punitive damages. In New York, however, punitive damages may
be awarded when the wrongdoer has acted maliciously, wantonly, or
with recklessness that betokens improper motive or vindictiveness. 96
The exclusion of punitive damages is usually founded upon the basic
policy purposes of the acts and is not meant to deny deserved relief
to the claimant. Because punitive damages are in the nature of a

90. 28 U.S.C. §2402 (1964).
91. See Moos v. United States, 225 F.2d 705 (8th Cir. 1955). Recovery was
denied on ground that surgical operation on wrong leg was a battery under state
law.
92. See Note, Remedies Against the United States and Its Officials, 70 HARV.
L. REV. 827, 892 (1957).
93. Ibid. See CAL. GOV'T CODE §§816, 821.6 (malicious prosecution).
94. 28 U.S.C. §2674 (1964).
95. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§818, 825. No damages may be recovered for an injury
to a state prisoner or mental patient either. See CAL. GOV'T CODE §§844.6, 854.8.
But see CAL. GOV'T CODE § §845.4, .6, 855, .2.
96. See Darlow v. State, 207 Misc. 124, 137 N.Y.S.2d 69 (1955).
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punishment to the tortfeasor, it seems unnecessary for the government
to punish itself beyond complete restitution for the injuries suffered.
The ultimate burden of recovery falls upon the taxpayers. For this
reason it would be desirable to exclude punitive payments under a
state act.
Indemnification
The public entities in California are, in most cases, ultimately
liable for the acts or omissions of employees occurring within the
scope of their employment since the employee is often able to recover any claims he himself was forced to pay. The act is not unique
in indemnifying its employees except to the extent it requires the
present or former employee to give notice to the public entity and allow it to defend.9 7 If, however, the public entity did not conduct the
defense, such employee may nevertheless recover from the public
entity if he establishes that the act or omission upon which the claim
or judgment is based occurred within the scope of his employment.98
On the other hand, nothing in the act establishes the liability of a
public entity when the employee has been guilty of actual fraud, corruption, or actual malice. Before the employee may recover from
the public entity, he must also overcome this guilt. Furthermore,
whenever the employee has acted with fraud, actual malice, or corruption the public entity has the right to recover from the guilty
employee any amount paid.99 The commission recognized that when
any fraud, corruption, or malice exists, the interests of the public
entity and the employee will conflict since the public entity will not
be ultimately liable.100 For this reason, when the public entity
assumes the defense of the employee in such cases, it must reserve
the right of indemnity from the employee by agreement with the
employee or waive its right.11
The merit of this scheme is in its attempt to establish a just balance between complete liability on one hand and an immunity designed to temper the burden placed upon the public for certain actions
of its employees. These specifically enumerated liabilities and immunities are founded upon California's own prior experiences and upon
the experiences of others in an effort to avoid as much uncertainty as
possible and to provide a stable basis for financial responsibility at all
97. CAL. Gov'T CODE

§825.

98. CAL. Gov'T CODE §§825.2 (a), (b).
99. The public entity may recover from the employee even when the employee
would have been personally immune from liability had he been sued directly. See
CAL. Gov'T CODE §§816, 821.6 (malicious prosecution).
100. CAL. Gov'T CODE §825.6 (a).
101. CAL. Gov'T CODE §825.2.
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levels of government. It is a reasonable approach and one that merits
the consideration of future state acts.
CLAIMS, ACTIONS AND JUDGMENTS

The 1963 California Code went to great lengths so that all
claims might be handled through one means or another. Public
entities may establish claims boards' °2 or appoint claims officers who
may settle all claims or delegate that authority. 1°3 The ability to
settle claims and avoid litigation is often beneficial to both parties.
Similarly, the FTCA provides that the head of each federal agency,10 4
or his designee, acting on behalf of the United States may settle any
claim for money flowing from a negligent or wrongful act or omission
of any government employee acting within the scope of his employment. But the damages must not exceed 2,500 dollars.1 0 5 It is often
difficult to explain why an action for damages in excess of 2,500
dollars in which the precise amount is readily determinable and is
satisfactory to both parties cannot be settled without resorting to
a plenary trial. The inability to settle these claims poses added
financial burdens upon the administration of the system and causes
unnecessary delay in the final disposition of cases. Nevertheless, the
restriction must be explained from a consideration of the purpose of
of the act. Although the FTCA is essentially a scheme for assuring
relief for claimants, it must also be viewed as an attempted organizational improvement providing a more efficient use of Congressional
time.106 Because the FTCA represented a substantial surrender of
control over the settlement of claims against the Government, it is
practical to conclude that Congress saw no reason to remove the
discretion of settlement from itself only to place it with another administrative body without a limitation upon such control. But the
soundness of this explanation is questionable. Under the FTCA the
process of settlement is being surrendered to the heads of the federal
agencies who have both ability and an interest in reducing the unnecessary cost of litigation when possible. If Congress fears excessive
102.

CAL. Gov'T CODE §935.2.

103.

CAL. Gov'T CODE § §935.4, .6, 948, 949.

104.

28 U.S.C. §2677 (1964).

105. 28 U.S.C. §2672 (1964) (also, the heads of each federal agency must report
annually to Congress all claims paid under this section); 28 U.S.C. §2673 (1964).
Originally the FTCA placed a 1,000 dollar maximum upon claims that could be
settled but a 1959 amendment raised this amount to 2,500 dollars. This is not
intended to be a restriction upon the amounts recoverable, but is intended to
provide a basis for settling a larger number of claims coming under the maximum

limit. Even the amended maximum is subject to criticism.
106. See note 11 supra.
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or frivolous settlements, it could simply require the courts to approve all settlements in excess of a stated maximum. To deny settlement altogether 'beyond a nominal maximum would, likewise, unreasonably retard the efficient administration of a state tort claims act.
Like the FTCA, no action may be maintained in California until
it has been presented to the public agency 0 7 and has been acted
upon or rejected by the board.108 The public entity may require the
claimant to secure the cost of the action.109
In an attempt to provide uniformity, the California Legislature
enacted a single claims procedure for both state and local claims.
Generally, the statutes require that all claims be presented within
100 days of the cause of action.110 But if the claimant was disabled
or his failure to comply with the 100 days was due to mistake, surprise,
inadvertence, or excusable neglect, and the public entity has not been
prejudiced, he may bring the action within one year. 1 This liberal
allowance in bringing claims seems in line with the policy of the act.
FINANCING THE LIABILITY OF PUBLIC ENTITIES

The California Act attempts to insure that the waiver of immunity

is not defeated by the inability of the public entities to meet the
judgments against it.j'2 Local entities are required to levy taxes or
otherwise secure sufficient revenue to pay all outstanding claims."'

The commission recognized the inequality of financial position among
various public entities and has provided that payment of claims that
would cause undue hardship may be paid over an extended period
up to ten years."

4

Further provisions are made for bond financing to

meet tort judgments that may be extended over forty years." 5 It is
also allowable for several public entities to buy group insurance to
spread the cost of small entities over a larger group." 6 The wisdom
of such provisions will lie with experience. It is impossible to foresee all contingencies that will give rise to increased liability. Even
107. See CAL. Gov'T CODE §§905-.6 (not all claims are required to be presented).
108. CAL. Gov'T CODE §945A.
109. CAL. Gov'T CODE §947. See also CAL. Gov'T CODE §951, which requires
a minimum of $100 and requires that in no event where a judgment is rendered
for the public employee shall the cost be less than $50 per plaintiff.
110. CAL. GOV'T CODE §911.2.
111. CAL. Gov'T CODE §§911A-912.2.
112. CAL. Gov'T CODE §970.2 (a writ of mandate may be secured to compel a
local public entity to require payment of a tort judgment).
113. CAL. Gov'T CODE §§970-A.
114. CAL. GOV'T CODE §970.6 (b).
115. CAL. Gov'T CODE §§975-978.8.
116. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§989-9912, 11007.4.
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though the risk assumed by a public entity is often unrelated to its
size or financial ability, a tort claims act should not restrict the allowance of full recovery. 117 Such restrictions merely ignore the goal of
responsible public liability when adequate insurance, financing, and
state assistance are possible.
CONCLUSIONS

Florida has an excellent opportunity to construct and adopt a tort
claims act that will, to a great extent, have been pretested by its application in other states and proved in its ability to meet all the
financial and administrative responsibilities.
The problems of drawing standards of governmental liability
and immunity are immensely difficult. The comprehensive scheme
plan as adopted in California possesses the advantage of being flexible
enough to tailor legislation to the unique conditions within our own
state and to provide a more predictable basis for liability insurance.
OSMOND

C. HOWE, JR.

117. The California Commission recognized that a few types of public entities
are financially dependent upon some other public entity from whom they derive
all or part of their funds. In these situations the supporting entity should be
required to appropriate funds to cover its prorata share of the tort judgments.
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